The moderate enlightenment, the radical enlightenment and law

One of the difficulties standing in the way of characterizing law in European civilization is the failure to appreciate the opposition between what have recently come to be known as the Radical and the Moderate Enlightenments. There is of course an appreciation of the major difference between the traditions of Roman Law, Civil Law and Common Law and of diverse schools of jurisprudence, but without appreciating the opposition between the Radical and the Moderate Enlightenments, one major tradition of thought on the law tends to be overlooked, and the significance of mainstream traditions of legal thought are not fully understood. In this paper I will briefly discuss the opposition between the Radical and the Moderate Enlightenments, and point out its relevance for understanding law. To do this requires some background to the Enlightenment, showing what it was reacting against. The problem with this, however, is that European history is commonly understood in a way that does not acknowledge the place of the Radical Enlightenment. To appreciate properly the Radical Enlightenment it is first necessary to look at how European history as it pertains to legal thought is commonly understood, and then point out what difference it makes to take into account the radical Enlightenment.